First published in 1979. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Introduction i This book is about how we study history, how we research and write about it, and how we read it. In the postmodern age, historians are being ...

In this paper, I reinterpret Kant’s Transcendental Analytic as a description of a cognitive architecture. I describe a computer implementation of this architecture, and show how it has been applied to two unsupervised learning tasks. The resulting program is very data efficient, able to learn from a tiny handful of examples. I show how the program achieves data-efficiency: the constraints described in the Analytic of Principles are reinterpreted as strong prior knowledge, constraining the set of possible solutions.

This paper describes an attempt to repurpose Kant’s a priori psychology as the architectural blueprint for a machine learning system. First, it describes the conditions that must be satisfied for the agent to achieve unity of experience: the intuitions must be connected, via binary relations, so as to satisfy various unity conditions. Second, it shows how the categories are derived within this model: the categories are pure unary predicates that are derived from the pure binary relations. Third, I describe how (...) Kant’s cognitive architecture has been implemented in a computer system (the Apperception Engine) and show in detail what it is like for the system to construct a unified experience from a sequence of raw sensory input. (shrink)

In this paper we compare Kierkegaard’s and Marx’s views on social reform. Then we argue that Kierkegaard’s own reasoning is consistent with the expression of neighbor-love through collective action, i.e. social reform. However, Kierkegaard’s approach to social reform would be vastly different than Marx’s. We end by reviewing several questions that Kierkegaardian social reformers would ask themselves. Our hope is that this exploration will provide helpful insights into how those who genuinely love their neighbors ought to seek the common good (...) through collective action. (shrink)

Research in multi-agent systems typically assumes a regulative model of social practice. This model starts with agents who are already capable of acting autonomously to further their individual ends. A social practice, according to this view, is a way of achieving coordination between multiple agents by restricting the set of actions available. For example, in a world containing cars but no driving regulations, agents are free to drive on either side of the road. To prevent collisions, we introduce driving regulations, (...) insisting that everyone drives on the left hand side of the road. We accept this limitation on our freedom because it lowers the probability of a collision. -/- This paper describes AI systems that are based on the constitutive view of social practice. According to this alternative view, there are certain actions that are only available to the agent because he is participating in a practice of a certain sort. For example, you can swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood without participating in any particular practice - but this action will only constitute a strike if you are participating in a game of baseball. I can raise my hand whenever I like, but this only counts as voting for the motion within the institution of voting. But not all the examples are from frivolous, optional or institutional activities. Sellars and Brandom argue that even the fundamental act of assertion is only possible within the context of a particular social practice: the Game of Giving and Asking for Reasons. -/- The constitutive view, which is familiar to philosophers, is relatively unknown within the AI community. -/- The central aim of this paper is to show how the constitutive view of practice can be put to use in AI applications. (shrink)

We are able to participate in countless different sorts of social practice. This indefinite set of capacities must be explainable in terms of a finite stock of capacities. This paper compares and contrasts two different explanations. A standard decomposition of the capacity to participate in social practices goes something like this: the interpreter arrives on the scene with a stock of generic practice-types. He looks at the current scene to fill-in the current tokens of these types. He looks at the (...) current state of these practice tokens to see what actions are available to him. He uses his current desires to choose between these various possible actions. I argue that this standard explanation is defective, drawing on arguments by Searle and Wittgenstein and Garfinkel. I propose an alternative explanation, in which the participants must continually show each other the state of the scene in order to maintain the scene’s intelligibility. I provide a simple formal language in which to describe this alternative approach, in which we can state quite precisely what someone is doing when they participate in a practice. This language is related to both deontic and epistemic logics, but it is much simpler – it does not include the classic propositional connectives, and it is driven by a very different set of assumptions. The inspirations for this formal language are Searle’s analysis of directions of fit, Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology. (shrink)

The central claim of normative pragmatism is that intentional states can be explained in terms of participation in practices. My aim in this paper is not so much to defend this claim as to rearticulate it in a different medium: the medium of computation. I describe two computer programs in which this claim is re-expressed. The first is the latest version of THE SIMS, in which participation in practices enables the Sims to do and understand more. The second is a (...) prototype simulation of philosophical debate. In this second program, normative pragmatism is expressed at two different levels: once as the theory powering the implementation, and once as a set of claims which are debated by the simulated philosophers. Here, a philosophical theory is used to implement a system in which that very same theory is articulated, challenged, and justified. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to address a fundamental challenge for machine intelligence: to understand whether and how a machine’s internal states and external outputs can exhibit original non-derivative intentionality. This question has three aspects. First, what does it take for a machine to exhibit original de dicto intentionality? Second, what does it take to exhibit original de re intentionality? Third, what is required for the machine to defer to the external objective world by respecting the word-to-world direction of fit? (...) I attempt to answer the first challenge by providing a constitutive counts-as understanding of de dicto intentionality. This analysis involves repurposing Kant’s vision of a self-legislating agent as a specification of a machine that reprograms itself. I attempt to answer the second and third challenges by extending Kant’s synchronic model of de dicto intentionality with Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s diachronic model of de re intentionality, using Hegel’s notion of recollection to provide an understanding of what is involved in achieving deference to the external world. (shrink)

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating that (...) the strong supervenience claim used by Conee and Feldman is consistent with cognitive externalism (often called ?the extended mind hypothesis?). Briefly, cognitive externalism claims that the mental states themselves (rather than their contents) constitutively depend on factors outside the bodily individual. Given this possibility, I claim Conee and Feldman's supervenience principle no longer suits the purposes to which they put it. (shrink)

In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans argues that the content of perceptual experience is nonconceptual, in a sense I shall explain momentarily. More recently, in his book Mind and World, John McDowell has argued that the reasons Evans gives for this claim are not compelling and, moreover, that Evans’s view is a version of “the Myth of the Given”: More precisely, Evans’s view is alleged to suffer from the same sorts of problems that plague sense-datum (...) theories of perception. In particular, McDowell argues that perceptual experience must be within “the space of reasons,” that perception must be able to give us reasons for, that is, to justify, our beliefs about the world: And, according to him, no state that does not have conceptual content can be a reason for a belief. Now, there are many ways in which Evans’s basic idea, that perceptual content is nonconceptual, might be developed; some of these, I shall argue, would be vulnerable to the objections McDowell brings against him. But I shall also argue that there is a way of developing it that is not vulnerable to these objections. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss logic from a naturalist point of view, characterizing it as those shared patterns of thought which are socially selected from among the various patterns of thought to which we are naturally inclined. Drawing on Evans-Pritchard's anthropology. I discuss a particular example of Zande thought. I argue that Evans-Pritchard's and Timm Triplett's analyses of this example make the mistake of applying Western logic to Zande beliefs and thus find a contradiction. I argue that from (...) the naturalistic point of view. Zande logic is different from Western logic and that there is no contradiction in Zande thought. (shrink)

Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that (...) some such statements might actually fail to have a determinate truth-value. That makes Indefinitism a cousin of mathematical Intuitionism. (shrink)

There are two main models for explaining Frege's notion of sense, both of which have their roots in the work of Sir Michael Dummett. One, nowadays most familiar from the work of David Chalmers, is broadly internalist and descriptivist in character. The other, most familiar from the work of Gareth Evans, is externalist and anti-descriptivist. I first consider the former project, arguing that Dummett anticipated Chalmers's version of the view, and that no version of this view is going to (...) be defensible. The arguments are somewhat different from those familiar from the literature. I then consider Evans's view and argue that, while it is not vulnerable to many of the objections that have been made to it, it does not really succeed as an account of sense, because it forces us to abandon Frege's view that sense is an aspect of representational content. (shrink)

_Desk Set_, a 1957 20th Century Fox studio comedy, made with the sponsorship of IBM, charts the relationship between a reference librarian, Bunny Watson, and Richard Sumner, the inventor of a computer which appears to threaten her job. The film displays a thriving philodendron within Bunny’s skyscraper office, illustrating her organic style of thinking, and implicitly inviting us to see the plant in opposition to the computer. The suggestion that the plant is in some sense excessive, claiming attention beyond (...) the norms of the ornamental background houseplant, opens questions about how we look at plants on film. We find here a reframing of figure and ground, which relates the philodendron to moments where plants become conspicuous in early film and in horror. _Desk Set_ reflects a vegetal landscape characterised by all the commonplace instrumentalising of plants in modernity, amongst which the philodendron emerges as an exception. The plant does not point outwards to a putative wilderness. Instead, our looking at it allows us to contemplate it as an individuated specimen, and to move from that act of looking to recognise its deep entanglement with the urban environment, and with human care. (shrink)

In The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness and the First-Person Stance, Jonardon Ganeri draws on the ancient Indian Cārvāka philosophy to delineate a “transformation” account of strong emergence, and argues that the account adequately addresses the well-known “causal exclusion problem” formulated by Kim. Ganeri moreover suggests that the transformation account is superior to the enactive account of emergence, developed by Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson for the latter merely “sidesteps” the exclusion problem. In this commentary, presented in an “author meets critics” panel (...) at the Pacific APA 2016, I suggest that, contrary to Ganeri’s claim, the enactive account does not merely sidestep the causal exclusion problem—the response the enactive account can offer is actually highly similar to the response offered by the transformation account. (shrink)

In "Counting and Indeterminate Identity", N. Ángel Pinillos develops an argument that there can be no cases of `Split Indeterminate Identity'. Such a case would be one in which it was indeterminate whether a=b and indeterminate whether a=c, but determinately true that b≠c. The interest of the argument lies, in part, in the fact that it appears to appeal to none of the controversial claims to which similar arguments due to Gareth Evans and Nathan Salmon appeal. I argue for (...) two counter-claims. First, the formal argument fails to establish its conclusion, for essentially the same reason Evans's and Salmon's arguments fail to establish their conclusions. Second, the phenomena in which Pinillos is interested, which concern the cardinalities of sets of vague objects, manifest the existence of what Kit Fine called `penumbral connections', phenomena that the logics Pinillos considers are already known not to handle well. (shrink)

The recent removal of the Richard Prince’s artwork Spiritual America from the Tate Modern’s “Pop Life: Art in a Material World” exhibition is the most recent and high-profile case of a work of art being withdrawn from a gallery in the UK on the grounds that it has allegedly breached legislation concerning indecent images of children. Surprisingly, the issue has been hardly considered by academics from law departments and is almost entirely ignored by philosophers specializing in aesthetics and ethics. (...) This essay considers the ethics of images of children by drawing from continental ethics and aesthetics, and by engaging with the only significant treatment of the subject undertaken by a philosopher, namely Peter J. King’s “No Plaything.” This paper shows that a continental perspective can open up positions that King’s ‘objectivist utilitarianism’ is oblivious of. In particular, the essay draws from Derrida’s reading of Kant’s Third Critique and the former’s quasi-conception of “the frame” in The Truth in Painting and “droit de regard” in Right of Inspection. In distinction to King, this paper engages with the actual existing reality of currently enacted laws and their application in particular cases such as in Spiritual America. I will begin with art ‘in the frame’ as the colloquial expression has it, art wrongfully and unjustly accused by the police. I will proceed via an examination of the question of the frame in Kant and Derrida, to demonstrate a need to reclaim the ethical status of works of art. The core procedure of my paper will be a ‘rediscovery’ of Spiritual America as the Kantian example that allows us to find the law. My argument will be that no work of art or image can of itself be decent or indecent. (shrink)

This reprint of a collection of essays on problems concerning future generations examines questions such as whether intrinsic value should be placed on the preservation of mankind, what are our obligations to posterity, and whether potential people have moral rights.

This dissertation focuses on the massive modularity hypothesis defended by evolutionary psychologists---the hypothesis that the human mind is composed largely or perhaps even entirely of special purpose information processing organs or "modulees" that have been shaped by natural selection to handle the sorts of recurrent information processing problems that confronted our hunter-gatherer forebears. ;In discussing MMH, I have three central goals. First, I aim to clarify the hypothesis and develop theoretically useful notions of "module" and "domain-specificity" that can play the (...) roles required of them by evolutionary psychology. Second, I aim to evaluate the plausibility MMH in the light of the broad range of arguments that have been developed and defended in the literature. I argue that all the main, general arguments both for and against MMH are unsatisfactory. Moreover, I suggest that if the case for MMH is to be made, it will only result from the successive accumulation of specific, empirical evidence for the existence of particular modules. ;Finally, I address a range of issues that arise from evolutionary psychological approaches to reasoning and rationality. Much of what evolutionary psychologists have said about human reasoning is in response to a widely discussed "pessimistic" interpretation that has been developed and defended by Kahneman, Tversky and their followers. According to this view, human beings are prone to systematic deviations from appropriate norms of rationality because they lack the underlying competence to handle a wide array of reasoning tasks. Evolutionary psychologists appear to reject this pessimistic interpretation in favor of the view that we possess a wide range of reasoning modules that employ rational rules of inference. I argue, however, that there is no genuine disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and their opponents over the extent to which human beings are rational. I also discuss the distinction between competence efforts and performance efforts. Although this distinction has played a central role in recent discussions of human rationality, I argue that if MMH is true, then we face insurmountable problems in trying to draw the performance error/competence error distinction. (shrink)

The Promise of Phenomenology: Posthumous Papers of John Wild includes articles that remained unpublished during Wild's lifetime, some of which he was preparing for publication, a journal that he kept, as well as a masterful exposition and commentary on Emmanuel Levinas' book, Totality and Infinity. This book gives a lively picture of a master philosopher at work conveying the vitality and importance of philosophy to everyday life.

If the argument from analogy is an argument for other minds it must rely on a single case, The correlation of your mind with your body. If instead it only attempts to show that certain sorts of experiences are associated with other bodies, It can rely on innumerable correlations of your experiences with your behavior. Having determined in this way that ostensive memories are associated with another body and that they are the kind one would expect if one mind had (...) been associated with this body throughout its existence, You can then offer another argument to this effect--And you could do so even if your own memories associated your own experiences with a succession of different bodies. (shrink)

Bringing together essays that span the career of I.A. Richards--as both literary critic and pedagogue--this collection provides a much-needed re-introduction to a thinker whose works have been largely neglected of late. Carefully chosen, edited, and annotated, the selections make accessible a wide array of Richards's ideas on language and learning, focusing on his discussion of literacy, his critique of positivist linguistics, his explorations of C.S. Peirce's semiotics, and his theory of translation, which led not only to his well-known analysis of (...) the structure and foundation of metaphor but to one of the earliest and most cogent formulations of reader-response theory. Berthoff's editing eliminates the distracting elements of Richards's style--the digressions and obscure allusions that have often hindered readers, and have in part contributed to the neglect his work has met with in recent years--while identifying and illuminating the chief principles of his critical thought and practice. Organized in four parts--Practical Criticism, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, The Meaning of Meaning, and Design for Escape--the book offers a lucid introduction to Richards's writings, with valuable headnotes to each section and a unique index of "speculative instruments" that examines the principal ideas Richards thought with. Readers are certain to find this volume essential to an understanding of Richards's "practical criticism," and invaluable in sharpening and re-directing their own thoughts on current linguistic practice, literary criticism, and educational theory. (shrink)

Due to investments in interdisciplinary research endeavors, the number and variety of interdisciplinary research centers have grown exponentially during the past decades. While interdisciplinary research centers rely on varied organizational arrangements, we know little about the conditions and processes that mediate collaborative arrangements and interdisciplinary research outcomes. This study examines how different collaborative arrangements shape scholars’ experiences of interdisciplinary research and understandings of interdisciplinary knowledge culminations in the context of university-based research centers. We conducted three in-depth qualitative case studies on (...) different centers, which recruited researchers from natural sciences, medicine, and social sciences. We refer to them as the Biotech Center, the Environmental Center, and the Premature Birth Center. Our analysis of 53 interviews with interdisciplinary scholars across the three centers demonstrates that the scholars perceive particular features of the centers’ collaborative arrangements as meaningful for interdisciplinary collaboration. Specifically, the center’s mission, physical architecture, and leadership and task structure were seen as affecting scholars’ motivation, interaction, and inclusion in the centers, which then shaped the interdisciplinary knowledge culminations. At the Biotech Center, knowledge was translated towards concrete products, at the Environmental Center knowledge was pooled together from varied fields to create new problem framings, and at the Premature Birth Center, interdisciplinary collaboration was crafted through top-down knowledge brokerage. (shrink)